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Abstract 
Cryptographic hash function is an important cryptographic tool in the field of 
information security.  Design of most widely used hash functions such as MD5 and 
SHA-1 is based on the iterations of compression function by Merkle-Damgård 
construction method with constant initialization vector. Merkle-Damgård construction 
showed that the security of hash function depends on the security of the compression 
function. Several attacks on Merkle-Damgård construction based hash functions 
motivated researchers to propose different cryptographic constructions to enhance the 
security of hash functions against the differential and generic attacks. Cryptographic 
community had been looking for replacements for these weak hash functions and they 
have proposed new hash functions based on different variants of Merkle-Damgård 
construction. As a result of an open competition NIST announced Keccak as a SHA-3 
standard. This paper provides a review of cryptographic hash function, its security 
requirements and different design methods of compression function. 
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1. Introduction  
Cryptographic hash function is a one-way and compression function that converts an 
arbitrary length message to a fixed length hash value. This hash value of a message 
is also known as the fingerprint of the message. Any small change or modification in 
the input data causes the drastic change in the hash value. Cryptographic hash 
function is widely used in security applications and protocols [1]. Hash functions are 
targeted heavily by cryptanalysts as they are a fundamental building block for many 
security applications. Cryptographic hash function ensures the integrity and 
authentication in the communication. There are various applications of 
cryptographic hash function such as pseudo-random string generation, digital 
signature and MAC.  
 The basic operation of cryptographic hash function has been shown in Figure 1. 
A cryptographic hash function is like a deterministic and computationally efficient 
random function. Cryptographic hash function has to satisfy requirements of 
onewayness and collision resistance. Onewayness means that the method to 
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calculate a hash value from a given message is easy, but it is computationally 
infeasible to generate any message that yields a given hash value. Collision 
resistance means it is extremely difficult to find two messages that have the same 
hash value. Cryptographic hash functions are classified into unkeyed hash functions 
and keyed hash functions. Unkeyed hash functions, also known as modification 
detection codes (MDCs), use message as a single input whereas keyed hash 
functions, also known as message authentication codes (MACs), can be viewed as 
hash functions which take two functionally distinct inputs, a message of arbitrary 
finite length and a fixed length secret key.  
 
  
Figure 1. Cryptographic hash function 
Formally, a hash function can be shown as:    *: 0,1 0,1 nh  . It presents that an 
input is arbitrary length of any binary string, and the output is n bits of binary string. 
We usually call n as the size of hash value. A hash function must satisfy the 
following properties;  
Compression: h maps an input M of an arbitrary bit length (up to a predefined very 
long maximum length) to an output of a fixed bit length n.  
Ease of computation: for a given input M and a hash function h, the process of 
computing h(M) should be easy and fast. 
(1) Preimage resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any input which 
hashes to any pre-specified output i.e., given a hash value H, it is 
computationally infeasible to find an input M such that h(M) H. 
(2) Second preimage resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any 
second input which has the same output as any specified input. That is, 
given an input M, it is computationally infeasible to find another input 
Msuch that h(M) h(M) and M M. This is also known as weak 
collision resistance. 
(3) Collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find two different 
inputs with the same output. That is, it is computationally infeasible to find a 
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pair of inputs, M and M, such that h(M) h(M) and M M. This is also 
known as strong collision resistance. 
(4) Near-collision resistance: it is computationally difficult to find any two 
different inputs M and M, that have a low Hamming weight between their 
hash values, i.e., h(M) differs from h(M)by a few number of bits. 
(5) Partial preimage resistance: given a hash value, it is computationally 
difficult to recover any part of the message. 
(6) Non-correlation: the input bits of an input M should not be correlated to the 
output bits of h(M) . 
(7) Random behaviour: hash function should have random behaviour. That is, 
given a particular input M it should be infeasible to predict any output bits 
of h(M) without actually applying the function h. 
(8) Deterministic nature: hash function h should be deterministic, i.e. given a 
particular input M, the function always computes the same output h(M) . 
 
Properties preimage, second preimage and collision resistance are ground 
properties of a hash function. These are NIST core requirements for a cryptographic 
hash algorithm and are the requirements which are generally of most practical 
importance. It is always important to achieve the first five properties as much as 
possible. Preimage resistance is important in some authentication scenarios and 
password storage where one does not send plain messages with their hash values, so 
if adversary can reverse the hash function he/she will be able to find the original 
message. Second preimage is for preventing the adversary from changing the 
original message in a way that the hash value remains unchanged. Collision 
resistance is stronger notion than preimage and second preimage resistance. 
Collision resistance always implies property second preimage resistance but does 
not imply preimage resistance. Collision resistance is easy to breach, so most 
cryptanalysis target collision attack. Collision resistance is important for digital 
signatures. The properties of second preimage resistance and collision resistance 
may seem similar but the difference is that in the case of second preimage resistance, 
the attacker is given a message to start with, but for collision resistance no message 
is given; it is simply up to the attacker to find any two messages that yield the same 
hash value. The term computationally infeasible or computationally difficult means 
that the complexity of an algorithm to break any of these properties is not less than 
that of the generic attack required to break that property. 
For a n-bit hash function, we have a generic collision attack with complexity 
2n/2, while brute force preimage or second preimage attacks have complexity 2n. In 
case of collision attack, birthday attack is popularly used exhaustive search. The 
term computational easiness might mean polynomial time and space; or more 
practically, within a certain number of machine operations or time units [2]. 
Unkeyed hash function is further classified into oneway hash function (OWHF) and 
collision resistant hash function (CRHF). A hash function that satisfies first four 
properties mentioned above is termed as an oneway hash function (OWHF). A hash 
function that satisfies the first five properties mentioned above is sometime called a 
collision resistant hash function (CRHF). The construction of CRHF is hard than 
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OWHF. CRHF usually deals with longer length hash values. Other then these 
functions universal one way hash function (UOWHF) also exist [1], [13].  
Paper discussed basic hash function design and MD construction in section 2. 
Section 3 gives iterative processing of the messages by different alternative hash 
construction methods. In this section weaknesses and security of compression 
function have also been highlighted. Paper is concluded in section 4.  
2. Basic hash function design  
Iterated hash functions have been the most successful method for constructing fast 
and secure hash functions. Usually, hash functions are built upon two components: a 
compression function and a domain extension algorithm.  
 
  
Figure 2. Iterative hash construction 
 
The compression function has the same security requirements that a hash function 
but takes fixed length inputs. The domain extension algorithm defines how to use 
the compression function in order to handle arbitrary length inputs. Almost all hash 
functions are iterative processes which hash inputs of arbitrary length by processing 
successive fixed-size blocks of input. In this section, we will discuss some popular 
known iterative hashing constructions. Common iterative structure is shown in the 
Figure 2. 
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2.1. Merkle-Damgård Construction 
From the early beginning of hash functions in cryptography, designers relied on the 
Merkle-Damgård (abbreviated to MD) construction. The MD construction was 
discovered by Merkle [3] and Damgård [4] in 1989 independently. Majority of 
famous hash functions such as MD4 [5], MD5 [6], SHA-0 [7], SHA-1 [8], 
RIPEMD-160 [9] etc., follow the iterative MD method. A compression function 
which takes a fixed input length value and outputs a fixed length hash value is core 
component of this construction.  
 
  
Figure 3. Merkle-Damgård construction 
 
A compression function accepts two inputs: a chaining variable and a block of 
message. A compression function accepts two inputs: a chaining variable and a 
block of message. Let      : 0,1 0,1 0,1b n nf   be a compression function which 
takes a b-bit message block and an n-bit chaining value. Let    *: 0,1 0,1 nh  be a 
MD construction built by iterating the compression function f in order to process a 
message of arbitrary length. A message M to be processed using h is always padded 
in a manner such that the length of the padded message is a multiple of the block 
length b of f. Bit-length b corresponds to input length of desired compression 
function f. The padding is done by adding after the last bit of the last message block 
a single 1-bit followed by the necessary number of 0-bits. Let M be abinary 
representation of the length of the message M. The binary encoding of the message 
length is also be added to complete the padding. This is called a Merkle-Damgård 
strengthening.Then input M subsequently divided into t blocks, each of bit-length b. 









H f H M i t
h M H





         (1)  Where f is the compression function of h, ܪ௜is the intermediate chaining variable 
between stage i-1 and stage i, and 0H is a pre-defined starting value or the initial 
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value IV. The block diagram of the iterative hash function using the compression 
function is shown in the Figure 3. The computation of the hash value is dependent 
on the chaining variable. At the start of hashing, this chaining variable has a fixed 
initial value which is specified as part of the algorithm.  
 
  
Figure 4. Detailed view of Merkle-Damgård construction 
 
This process continues recursively, with the chaining variable being updated under 
the action of different part of the message, until the entire message has been used. 
The final value of the chaining variable is then output as the hash value 
corresponding to that message. One of its distinctive features is that it promotes the 
collision resistance and preimage resistance of the compression function to the full 
hash function: for instance, a collision on the compression function can be deduced 
efficiently from a collision on the full hash function. The inclusion of the length at 
the end of the message is important for this situation, and is also important for 
preventing a number of attacks, including long-message attacks.  
 Merkle-Damgård construction proves that the security of hash function relies on 
the security of the compression function. Thus, in order to build a collision resistant 
hash function, it is sufficient to design a collision resistant compression function. 
Recent results, however, highlight some intrinsic limitations of the MD approach 
[27]. This includes being vulnerable to multicollision attacks [10], long second 
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preimages attacks [11], and herding attack [12]. Figure 4 shows detailed view of MD 
construction. 
3. Alternative construction methods 
3.1. Tree Construction 
This is the most parallelizable class of constructions and is mainly suited for multi 
core platforms where multiple processors can independently operate on different 
parts of the message simultaneously.  
 
  
Figure 5.Tree construction 
The compression function of tree construction is of the form    2: 0,1 0,1n nf  . 
However, the Damgård tree construction is not practical since the size of the binary 
tree grows with the length of the message. Figure 5 illustrates a typical tree based 
hashing construction. Damgård tree construction was later optimized by Sarkar and 
Scellenberg [14]. Sarkar and Scellenberg construction (SS construction) was a 
parallel version of MD construction. The main difference between SS construction 
and previous constructions is that authors consider the number of available 
processors to be fixed while the length of the message can be arbitrarily long. 
Thus SS construction considered a fixed processor tree and used it to hash 
arbitrarily long messages. Each processor simply computes the base hash function. 
Similarly, Carter and Wegman [15] used tree hashing techniques to build universal 
hash functions. This was followed up by Naor and Yung [16] and Bellare and 
Rogaway [17] in the context of UOWHFs (Universal One Way Hash Functions). In 
[18] Bellare and Micciancio proposed the randomize-then-combine paradigm, where 
the message is split into blocks, each block is processed via randomizing function 
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(derived from some standard hash function) and finally combined by an operation 
such as XOR. Although this structure was originally proposed to build incremental 
functions, it can be thought of as a 2- level tree and can still be parallelized since the 
randomization process of the individual blocks are independent. Tree-based 
constructions are slightly less popular than the iterative ones. 
3.2. Sponge Construction 
Sponge construction [19] is an iterative hash function construction, builds upon a 
fixed length transformation or permutation instead of a compression function and 
can generate output strings of infinite length. Sponge construction can be used to 




Figure 6.Sponge construction 
 
Basically, sponge hashing proceeds in two phases, the absorbing phase and the 
squeezing phase. The sponge operates on a fixed length state  0,1 r cs  composed 
of r bits (called bit-rate) and c bits (called capacity), through a function
   : 0,1 0,1r c r cf   which produces a transformation or permutation of s. In the 
absorbing phase, the message is divided into r-bit blocks (padded if necessary) and 
each block is XORed with the r part of s (initially,  0 r cs  ), f then iteratively 
processes s until all blocks are exhausted. In the squeezing phase, the state continues 
to be transformed or permuted by f but this time the r parts of the states are returned 
at every iterations as output blocks. Since the sponge construction supports variable 
length output, the user chooses the length of the final hash value which determines 
how many of the returned blocks in the squeezing phase need to be returned. 
Optionally, between two phases, some number of blank rounds can be applied. In 
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the blank rounds, there is no input to or output from the state. Only, f is applied to 
the state s. If f is expressed as a random function, the construction is called a T-
sponge, otherwise if it is expressed as a permutation then the construction is called a 
P-sponge. The security of a sponge construction depends on its capacity c, hash size 
n and function f. For P-sponge construction the complexity of a collision is 
2 2(2 , 2 )c nMin and complexity of preimage and second preimage is 2(2 ,2 )c nMin . 
Collision complexity of T-sponge construction is equal to the collision complexity 
of P-sponge construction. Finding a preimage costs (2 , 2 )c nMin and finding a second 
preimage costs (2 ,2 )c nMin N  for a T-sponge, where N is the length of the original 
message. Figure 6 illustrates the sponge construction. 
Hash functions such as Keccak [20] and PHOTON [21] are based on the 
sponge construction. Keccak has recently been selected as the winner of SHA-3 
competition. Although still considered an iterative construction, the sponge is 
completely different from the Merkle-Damgård construction. When iterated hash 
functions are considered, there always exist inner collisions which can be defined as 
if two message pair M1and M2give the same chaining value, then concatenation of 
M1and M2with collide suffix M*collide. In the sponge function construction, there 
also exist inner collisions and this is the only weaknesses of sponge functions so far. 
3.3. Wide and Double Pipe Construction 
Lucks has proposed a wide pipe and double pipe hash function construction [22] 
which provides an enhancement of the Merkle-Damgård construction. The wide pipe 
construction intended to increase the size of the internal state of n-bit hash function 
and w-bit compression function, where w n . This means that the wide pipe design 
obtains a greater internal state than message digest length by using a larger 
compression function.   
  
Figure 7.Wide-pipe construction 
 
Constructing a collision-resistant compression function with w n  output bits may 
be simpler than constructing an n-bit compression function with the same level of 
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collision resistance. Let  0 0,1 wH  be a random initial value. Using two 
compression functions: 
 : 0,1 wf     0,1 0,1m w  and    : 0,1 0,1 .w nf    Wide pipe hash is computed 
as: 
      
1( , ), 1 ,
( ) ( )
i i i
t
H f H M i t
h M f H
   

 (2)  Wide-pipe construction is shown in the Figure 7.  
On the other hand, the double pipe design maintains twice the hash size using the 
2w n compression function in parallel to process each message block. Using one 
compression function      : 0,1 0,1 0,1n n m nf   , with m n and two distinct 
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     




 (3)  
  
Figure 8. Double-pipe construction 
 
Double-pipe construction is shown in the Figure 8. From these designs Lucks 
showed that increasing the size of the internal state (i.e. the chaining variable) to 
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become larger than the size of the final hash value, would significantly improve the 
security of the hash function. This modification clearly thwarts the extension attack 
since in the wide and double pipe construction the final hash value is truncated, so in 
order to append an extension, the unknown discarded bits have to be guessed, which 
is clearly difficult if the number of the discarded bits is non-trivial. Furthermore, by 
increasing the size of the internal state, finding collisions for the compression 
function becomes harder, which complicates the other generic attacks. An obvious 
drawback of the wide and double pipe construction, however, is a degraded 
efficiency as the compression function now has larger input and output while 
keeping the hashing rate constant (the size of the compression function input 
corresponding to a message block is fixed) since the chaining variable input is 
increased. Also, adapting existing hash functions for the wide and double pipe 
construction may be difficult since it might be the only reasonable way to increase 
the internal state is to use multiple compression function calls in parallel for every 
iteration. Recently, Yasuda [23] adopted a slightly modified variant of the double 
pipe construction and proved its unforgeability beyond the birthday barrier. 
3.4. 3C Construction 
The 3C construction is the simplest variant of the MD construction that one can 
obtain to improve its security against multi block collision attack [24]. The 3C hash 
function processes the intermediate chaining values of the MD construction by 
maintaining a second internal chaining variable containing a value produced by 
repeatedly XORing the chaining variables while hashing a message; this variable is 
then processed in an extra finalisation call to the compression function. There are 
two chains in 3C construction: the accumulation chain and cascading chain. The 
accumulation chain and the compression function have an accumulator XOR 
function that works iteratively in the cascade chain, similarly to the MD 
construction. The processing in the 3C divides the message into t-blocks with 0IV  
representing the initial value. ia and ic are the chaining variables in the accumulation 
chain and cascade chain. The compression functions are executed three times for 
each block: the processing data block, padding block and forming the block Z in the 
accumulation chain. The 3C is as secure as the MD construction.  
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   




 (4)  
To increase the security level of 3C, 3C+ design has been proposed. In the 3C+ hash 
construction, there is an additional chain called the final chain. The final chain is 
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added to the cascade and accumulation chains of the 3C hash construction. The final 
compression function g at the last block takes the series of the result of the 
accumulation and final chains after padding. Due to this enhancement, the security 
level of 3C+ is higher than that of 3C and MD construction. 3C+ uses extra memory, 
but makes finding multi-block collisions more difficult. However, the 3C and 3C+ 
structures are slower because the processors have to process data sequentially, where 
every block takes its input from the previous block, causing sequential delay. 
However, in [25], it was shown that both 3C and 3C+ are indeed susceptible for 
multi-block attack. The designers of 3C claimed that while it is susceptible to the 
multi-collision attack, it resists the long messages 2nd pre-image and herding attacks. 
However, it was shown in [26] that 3C is also indeed susceptible to both the second 
preimage and herding attacks. 
3.5. The Prefix Free, Chop Constructions, NMAC and HMAC Constructions  
Coron et al. proposed, prefix-free, NMAC, and HMAC constructions as secure 
variants for the MD construction [28]. Later it is found that even though these 
constructions are indifferentiable from RO, they are not collision resistant. The 
prefix-free construction does not modify the Merkle-Damgård construction, instead 
it modifies the padding algorithm to make sure that the message is prefix free. One 
way to do this is by prepending or appending the length of the whole message to 
every message block. PFMD construction uses a padding function g which ensures 
that for any two messages ,M M with M M  , ( )g M  cannot be a prefix of ( )g M  . 
Let N is the length of the message M. Three variants of PFMD are:  
 
Varient1: 1gPF  
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Varient3: 3gPF  





( , , ),




M M M M b





  (7)  
 
The Chop construction is an n bit MD hash where r out of n bits of the hash value 
are chopped, thus producing an (n−r)-bit hash value. The chop construction 
basically removes a non-trivial number of bits from the final hash value. This, while 
it solves the indifferentiability issue, unfortunately lowers the security bounds of the 
hash function.  
 In NMAC, an independent function g is applied to the output of the last 
application of the compression function, while HMAC is a special case of the 
NMAC in which an extra compression function call is introduced. The HMAC hash 
construction hashes a message by applying the same f function twice, using the same 
IV. The NMAC and HMAC are computed as: 
 
NMAC: 









y f y M i t
y g y

   
 

 (8)  
HMAC: 
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3.6. Linear Hash and Linear XOR Hash  
The linear hash function is described by Bellare and Rogaway [28]. It accepts an 
additional key input in every call of the iteration. Moreover, each key is distinct and 
therefore LH requires number of key inputs that is a linear in the message size. It 
employs distinct compression functions for each message block evaluation. In the 
same paper another approach linear XOR (XLH) by Bellare and Rogaway [28] was 
discussed. In contrast to the LH hash function it adds the same number of distinct 
keys by XORing these with the chaining values resulting from each iteration of the 
Merkle-Damgård style hash function. The first key is XORed with the initialization 
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vector IV and the final key is XORed with the final intermediate chaining value, 
while the final hash result is left unmodified. 
3.7. Enveloped Merkle-Damgård 
The enveloped Merkle-Damgård [29] (EMD) was proposed by Bellare and 
Ristenpart and resembles the design of HMAC [30]. EMD uses two fixed 
initialization vectors 0IV and 1IV . The first vector is applied in a Merkle-Damgård 
style as input to the first compression function. The second 0IV  is provided as input 
to the final compression function together with the chaining variable and the final 
input message bits and this step is known as the “enveloping” step of the 
construction. Bellare and Ristenpart showed that EMD preserves collision 
resistance, indifferentiability from random oracle and indistinguishability from 












y f y M i t
y f y M IV


    
 

 (10)  
3.8. Merkle-Damgård with permutation 
The Merkle-Damgård with permutation, due to Hirose et al. is a simple variant of 
the original Merkle-Damgård design [31]. The only difference with the Merkle-
Damgård construction is that a permutation is applied before the processing of the 
last message block. The permutation masks the internal Merkle-Damgård style 
processing, similarly to the idea of EMD, and MDP is proven indifferentiable from a 
random oracle when the underlying compression function is an ideal function.  
 
  
Figure 9. Merkle-Damgård with permutation (MDP) construction 
  
MDP construction is shown in the Figure 9. The authors proved that the collision 
resistance of MDP follows trivially from the collision resistance of the Merkle-
Damgård construction as the former introduces minimal changes to the latter. The 
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authors also discussed the security of possible simple MAC constructions based on 
MDP. However, although with such a simple modification, the authors succeeded in 
proving a significant security gain, MDP seems to be able to thwart only the 
extension attack, but not other Merkle-Damgård generic attacks. Also, recently it 
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  

 (11)  
3.9. Zipper Hash Construction 
Zipper hash construction was developed by Liskov [32] that makes an ideal hash 
function from weak ideal compression function. Zipper hash structure was 
developed as a strengthen structure against multicolission attack. Let 
     : 0,1 0,1 0,1b n nf   and      : 0,1 0,1 0,1b n ng   becompression functions. 
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3.10. RMX Construction 
Randomized hashing was proposed by Halevi and Krawczyk [33]. It is somewhat 
different from other typical variants of Merkle-Damgård, instead it is a generic fix 
that can be applied on any construction. The RMX transform is in its essence a 
message modification technique. It prepends a random string s to the message as a 
first message block to be processed and then the same random string is XORed with 
each message block. The idea is to randomize the message inputs by XORing a salt 
input into the message.  
RMX was proposed as a general transform that is particularly well-suited for 
digital signature applications of hash functions, where a message M is first 
randomised with a salt s to produce a randomized message M  . A digital signature 
sign is then generated from M  . The original message M, the salt s and the signature 
sign are then sent to the verifier. When the verifier receives these parameters, it first 
randomises M with s to produce M and carries out standard signature verification 
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using M and sign. It aims the provision of security guarantees even when the 
compression function is compromised with respect to collision security. It was 
formally showed that just finding collisions on the compression function is not 
sufficient in order to break the resultant signatures: instead, the attacker needs to 
solve a much harder cryptanalytical problem, closer to finding second preimages. 
The authors claim that randomized hashing will strengthen any hash function, even 
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3.11. Dither Hash Construction 
The dither hash function by Rivest is another variant of MD construction which 
includes an additional counter-like input [34]. The design intension behind the dither 
construction is to add an iteration-dependent input to the compression function in 
order to defeat certain generic attacks. The additional input, called the “dithering” 
input, to the compression function is formed by the consecutive elements of a fixed 
sequence. This gives the attacker less control over the input of the compression 
function, and makes the hash of a message block dependent on its position in the 




Figure 10.Dither construction 
 
In the dither hash function, every call to the compression function f has the three 
inputs: the dithering sequence 1, , tD D D  which depends on the iteration, the 
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 Figure 10 shows the Dither construction. The dither value can be selected in many ways: one of the ways by following the suggestion of Kelsey and Schneier the dither 
value can be selected as the index, iD i . This approach is called the dithering by 
counter but this approach requires that compression function accept an arbitrary 
large input. Another suggestion for selecting the dither value can be a sequence of 
alternative 0’s and 1’s. 
A pseudorandom sequence can also be used as a dither value. This provides 
protection against message block repetition. In his proposal Rivest suggested the use 
the infinite abelian square-free sequence. The abelian square-free sequence is an 
aperiodic sequence over a finite alphabet with the property that no sub-word is 
repeated. However, the method proposed for integrating the dither value into 
concrete hash functions is inefficient, in the sense that it increases the number of 
calls to the compression function. No indifferentiability result is known for the 
Dither hash function. 
3.12. HAIFA Construction 
HAsh Iterative FrAmework (HAIFA) is a modified Merkle-Damgård construction 
proposed by Dunkelman and Biham [35]. It preserved all the good properties of 
Merkle-Damgård construction. HAIFA modifies Merkle-Damgård by introducing 
extra input parameters to the compression function. These are: a salt value and the 
number of bits hashed so far, which thwarts many of the generic attacks against the 
plain Merkle-Damgård construction since the input to every compression function 
call becomes unique and highly dependent on where the compression function call is 
made through the hashing chain. The inclusion of a bit counter ensures the suffix 
and prefix properties of the design and helps to prove it indifferentiable from a 
random oracle In fact, HAIFA can be considered a dedicated-key hash function.  
The idea of adding additional input parameters to the compression function has been 
previously proposed by Rivest through a process called dithering. The HAIFA is 
built by iterating a compression function: 
         : 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1n s nb mf      
(15)  The padding in HAIFA is very similar to the padding of Merkle-Damgård 
construction.Moreover, the padding is done by appending a single '1' bit followed by 
as many '0' bit as needed to complete an b-bit block after the message length and the 
digest size are appended. Then input M subsequently divided into t blocks 
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1, , tM M M  , each of bit-length b. iH is found by computing 1( , , , )i if H M bc s
where bc denotes the bit counter i.e. number of hashed bits so far and s denotes the 
salt, and this operation is repeated until message blocks ends in the iteration part. 
There does not exist any difference between iteration method of Merkle-Damgård 
and HAIFA. Only difference is between the compression functions. The hash 
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 An obvious drawback of HAIFA is efficiency degradation since the compression function now has more input parameters to process. Furthermore, HAIFA cannot be 
(easily) used to patch existing Merkle-Damgård based hash functions because a 
compression function designed for the Merkle-Damgård construction would not 
naturally accommodate the extra HAIFA parameter inputs. The idea is incorporated 
also in few SHA-3 candidates: BLAKE, ECHO and SHAvite-3. 
3.13. BCM 
The backwards chaining mode was proposed by Andreeva and Preneel. It uses three 
keys 1 2 3, ,k k k and of fixed length (b + 2n) bits, where 2k b and 1 3k k n  where 
n is the state and b is the block size. It XORs the key 1k and the most significant n 
bits of block 2M with the fixed initial chaining variable IV. The message block 1M  
together with the resulting value from the XOR computation form the input to the 
first application of f. In the iteration the message block iM and the chaining variable 
1iH  in-line are XORed with the most significant n bits of the next-in-line message 
block 1iM  and form the inputs to the ith compression function f. The one but last 
block 1tM  is interpreted differently than the rest of the message blocks. Here the 
difference is that the least significant n bits of 1tM  are XORed with the key 1k , the 
chaining variable 2tH  is XORed with the first significant bits of 2k and tM . The 
final input to the last compression function is provided by the last message block 
tM and the chaining variable 1tH  XORed with keys 2k and 3k , respectively.  
3.14. Nested Iteration 
NI is basically a keyed variant of the Merkle-Damgård construction making use of 
two keys , {0,1}kk k  . Beside being unforgeable, Bellare and Ristenpart later 
proved in [36] that NI is also indistinguishable from PRF, indifferentiable from RO, 
and if strengthening was used, NI is also collision resistant. 
301
JIOS, VOL. 41, NO. 2 (2017), PP. 283-304







( , , ), 1, , 1




H f H M k i t
H f H M k


    
 

 (17)  
3.15. Shoup Construction 
In [37], Shoup proposed an elegant keyed construction. Shoup's hash function (SH) 
derives from the linear XOR hash function and optimizes it in terms of the number 
of keys. It uses logarithmic number of keys (instead of linear), following a specific 
sequence. In addition to the key input of the compression function, the chaining 
variables of every compression function iteration in SH is further XORed with a key 
mask. A variant of the SH construction has been proposed by Bellare and Ristenpart 
in [37] that makes the last compression function call a wrapping call (this last 
application of the compression function is called an envelope). Thus, this variant is 
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 3.16. Chaining Shift 
The Chaining Shift (CS) construction was proposed by Maurer and Sjodin in [38] as 
a more efficient solution than the NI construction. The CS construction was shown 
to be unforgeable, indistinguishable from PRF, indifferentiable from RO, and the 
strengthened variant of it (with strengthened padding) is collision resistant. 
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 (19)  
4. Conclusion 
A cryptographic hash function plays a vital role in many security applications and 
protocols such as digital signatures and authentication schemes. Among several 
security requirements collision resistance is an important property of a cryptographic 
hash function. The security of hash function depends on the collision resistance 
property of the underlying compression functions. Merkle-Damgård construction 
method failed to preserve this important security property. In recent years, it has 
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been shown that hash functions based on weak Merkle-Damgård construction are 
vulnerable to different attacks. As a result researchers have given different 
construction methods to design the hash functions such as Haifa, Dither and Tree. 
This paper reviews different popular alternative construction methods to Merkle-
Damgård method and also discusses how these methods have strengthened the weak 
MD method. The use of hash functions based on Merkle-Damgård construction in 
different security products, services, algorithms and protocols makes them 
vulnerable to different cryptanalytic attacks. 
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